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INTRODUCTION  
The proliferation of state and local fusion centers and the efforts to partner them 
with the intelligence community have been compared to organizing a new little 
league baseball team. Just as each team in a league has different strengths and 
weaknesses each center has a different set of skills, abilities, and equipment.1 This 
paper provides a brief overview of the present status of state and local fusion centers, 
as well as the current policy issues and obstacles these centers face.   
Counter Terrorism: Not a New Mission for State and Local Law 
Enforcement 
Combating terrorism in the United States is not a new concept for state and local law 
enforcement.  There are a number of examples where state and local law 
enforcement have played a key role in detecting terrorist activity.  A simple traffic 
stop of a subject on April 19, 1995, by an Oklahoma state trooper, for driving a 
vehicle without a license plate resulted in the arrest of Timothy McVeigh for the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.2 On May 31, 2003, a local 
patrolman arrested the notorious Eric Robert Rudolph, a domestic terrorist who was 
on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Ten Most Wanted List for a series of 
bombings including one at the 1996 Olympics.  Rudolph was the subject of a 
tenacious manhunt in the Appalachian Mountains for several years before being 
arrested by a local police officer on routine patrol in the small town of Murphy, 
North Carolina.  Rudolph specifically targeted police and other first responders with 
secondary devices in some of his bombings.3 On April 4, 1980, the deadly Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN), a small, heavily armed terrorist 
organization responsible for over 100 bombings in major cities including Chicago, 
New York, and Miami suffered its most serious setback when its members were 
arrested by patrolmen in Evanston, Illinois, as they assembled in a park with several 
stolen vehicles, thirteen weapons, disguises, and false identifications, preparing to 
heist an armored truck at the prestigious Northwestern University.4  
Intelligence Not New to State and Local Law Enforcement 
While the concept of “fusion centers” is certainly new, many states have had a 
centralized intelligence system of some sort for decades. Typically, these have been 
housed in state police agencies, as a central repository on intelligence related to 
violent gangs, drug trafficking, prostitution, child exploitation, weapons smuggling, 
theft rings, and other crimes. In those states with a major city or county police 
department (such as New York, Los Angeles and Chicago) those agencies have also 
operated intelligence units.  For many states today’s fusion center is simply an 
extension of these intelligence units, with a higher degree of vertical (federal 
intelligence community) and horizontal (state/local) collaboration. Some have 
compared today’s fusion centers with “state police intelligence units on steroids.”5 
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What is new is the mission of preventing international terrorist attacks on U.S. 
soil and law enforcement is adjusting to a new enemy with new methods. Law 
enforcement organizations are also adjusting to new operational issues that were 
previously not areas of concern. According to Congressional testimony these include:  
1. The absence of a cohesive federal strategy regarding information sharing,  
2. Too many federal information sharing networks, and   
3. An inability or unwillingness on the part of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the FBI to work effectively together.6  
One example of an obstacle created by the lack of coordination between DHS and the 
FBI is security clearances.  State and local fusion centers are required to have 
security clearances in order to receive, analyze, store, and disseminate classified 
material.  Yet, in many cases it is reported the FBI is unwilling to accept those with 
DHS security clearances.  In still other cases, DHS requires verification that someone 
from a state or major city possesses an FBI clearance through a process where the 
clearance is “passed” or certified to DHS from the FBI.  Such problems can prove 
frustrating to state and local partners who are doing all they can to perform their role 
in homeland security.7 
Another example is the apparent mission overlap between DHS and the FBI.  A 
primary mission for many state and local fusion centers is collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating critical infrastructure data to DHS. Since the creation of the 
department, DHS has conducted several data calls in order to populate the national 
critical infrastructure database.  It also adopted the Automated Critical Asset 
Management Systems (ACAMS) system from the Los Angeles Police Department as a 
nationwide system to manage this data, urging state fusion centers to utilize this 
system. 
Yet the FBI has continued to operate a critical infrastructure protection program 
of its own, called Infraguard, which is quite popular in some states among the private 
stakeholders.  This presents a number of challenges for state and local fusion 
centers, which often find they are “caught in the middle,” trying to show a 
cooperative spirit between both agencies while also trying to maintain credibility 
with their private stakeholders who own, operate, and have a vested interest in 
protection of critical infrastructure.  Some in the private sector complain that the 
“federal government needs to get its act together” on this important issue soon, as its 
efforts appear to be disjointed and uncoordinated.8   
State and local stakeholders who operate fusion centers are often frustrated with 
trying to provide the necessary information to both agencies. In order to be effective, 
fusion centers need to work with both the FBI and DHS; the FBI is a critical partner 
and DHS provides needed funding.  According to one state fusion center 
commander, “we are anticipating this to be very challenging.”9 
As a recent Congressional report highlights, the evolution of state and local fusion 
centers leaves a number of looming issues.10 One issue is that many state and local 
fusion centers are in some ways less familiar with civil liberties issues and the federal 
regulations regarding intelligence storage, handling, and dissemination. As a result, 
more privacy concerns are likely to develop due to unintentional violations of 
intelligence rules.   
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 Fusion centers also face a number of long-term issues. Congress provided 
substantial resources to support the DHS grant program in the years following the 
9/11 attacks.  As time passes, such funding may taper off, leaving insufficient funding 
for fusion center operations.11 As those who have opened and operated such centers 
know, while funding sources have varied widely from state to state the majority of 
states have leveraged homeland security funds for equipment and analysts, subject 
to certain limitations imposed by DHS.12  
One of the most significant issues found in the Congressional research has been 
the absence of a well-defined long-term role for state and local fusion centers. 
According to testimony by Eileen Larence, Director of Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues  
The federal government has not clearly articulated the long term role it 
expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center 
management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as 
personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through an 
information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of 
centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments.13 
According to Congressional findings, there are currently fifty-eight fusion centers at 
the state and local level. Forty-three are considered operational, while fifteen are in 
various stages of development. Nine centers opened shortly after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Thirty-four became operational after January, 2004.  At least 
thirty-four fusion centers report employing federal personnel.14 
While many efforts have been made by the federal government to support fusion 
centers, many fusion center officials report challenges accessing and managing 
multiple information systems. The FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system and 
the DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) are mentioned 
prominently in the Congressional reports.  These multiple systems are reported to be 
causing “information overload” at many centers, often with redundant information.15 
To compound the problem, DHS continues to change the information-sharing 
platform, making it a challenge to establish stability among the fusion centers. 
Initially many fusion centers were operating on the Joint Regional Information 
Exchange System (JRIES), but then DHS directed they move to the HSIN system. 
Recent announcements suggest that platform will also soon be changing.16   
For many fusion center officials at the state and local level, the single biggest 
concern is sustainability. Van Godsey, director of the Missouri Information and 
Analysis Center (MIAC) states it this way: 
With this tremendous focus on fusion centers, my concern is sustainability of 
these centers and the national effort. Currently, any federal funding for fusion 
centers is located within the federal allocation to the states. The use of these 
funds is subject to local demands, politics and views that may not always be 
supportive of the fusion center effort.  If the federal government is going to 
look at the fusion centers and expect minimum capabilities, then I believe 
there are going to have to be controls to ensure a minimum level of funding.17 
Godsey advocates specific line item funding for fusion centers instead of the present 
method of funding.18 
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As Congressional reports point out, ultimately the federal government needs to 
make a policy decision about the future of state and local fusion centers.  As one 
report states, a number of questions need to be answered including the following:  
1. Do fusion centers solve the pre-9/11 information sharing problems, and as 
such, make Americans safer?  
2. Can fusion centers work if they aren’t part of an integrated philosophy of 
intelligence and security?  
3. Who benefits from fusion centers? Who should staff, fund, and oversee them? 
What role, if any, should fusion centers play in the Intelligence Community 
(IC)? What role should federal agencies play in fusion centers, to include 
funding?  
4. Is some basic level of common standards necessary in order for fusion centers 
to offer a national benefit? Does the federal government have an integrated 
national fusion center strategy? How is their performance to be measured?  
5. Is the current configuration of forty-plus fusion centers, with multiple centers 
in some states the most efficient way to structure them?19  
2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing 
The recent release of the National Strategy for Information Sharing in 
October,2007, certainly supports earlier Congressional findings that more federal 
leadership with regard to fusion centers is needed.20 Referencing Guideline 2 of the 
president’s December 16, 2006 Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, the strategy calls for a “common framework” to be developed 
governing the roles and responsibilities between the federal government, state, local, 
and tribal governments, and private sector entities.21 
The strategy also acknowledges the important role of state and local fusion centers 
as follows: “State and major urban area fusion centers are vital assets critical to 
sharing information related to terrorism. They will serve as the primary focal points 
within the State and local environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-
related information.”22   
The strategy also contemplates how state and local fusion centers may scrub and 
further disseminate classified terrorism-related intelligence to others in the region. 
Federal departments and agencies will provide terrorism-related information 
to State, local and tribal authorities primarily through these fusion centers. 
Unless specifically prohibited by law, or subject to security classification 
restrictions, these fusion centers may further customize such information for 
dissemination to satisfy intra- or inter State needs.23 
Additionally, the National Strategy addresses the important issue of public and 
private collaboration to protect critical infrastructure. “This Strategy builds on these 
efforts to adopt an effective framework that ensures a two way flow of timely and 
actionable security information between public and private partners.”  It also 
acknowledges the sensitivity of critical infrastructure information provided by the 
private sector and the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of such data 
when it is provided to governmental units.24   
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With proper support and guidance of state and local fusion centers, one can easily 
imagine a time when the U.S. has a significantly stronger situational awareness 
within its borders than we presently have today.  To be sure, there are many issues 
on the road ahead. Staffing, training, intelligence-handling procedures, benchmark 
capabilities, and sustained funding are among those issues. However, from the 
perspective of state and local fusion centers, great strides are being made in creating 
a lasting network across the nation through which terrorism-related threat 
intelligence can be effectively shared.  In some cases that capability extends to “all 
crimes” and “all hazards.” Those in the intelligence community who may have at first 
doubted these centers would ever play a role in our national security, now see these 
fusion centers gaining in strength and sophistication. In some cases, these centers 
are breaking new ground in the use of new and innovative methods for effective 
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.25 It is important to remember 
that state and local law enforcement have always had a public safety mission, dating 
back to the first county sheriffs. Given the tragic events of September 11, 2001, no 
one should underestimate the resolve and determination of state and local public 
safety agencies to do their part in keeping Americans safe. 
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